

Port of Milford Haven
LEISURE SAFETY DIGEST
2021



Port of Milford Haven

Introduction

Welcome to the third edition of the Port of Milford Haven's Leisure Safety Digest which looks back at 2021. Previous editions covering the 2019 and 2020 season have been very well received. It is encouraging that our leisure community has a healthy desire to learn from others' experience to help make their own leisure time safer and more enjoyable.

With overseas travel facing restrictions in 2021, we saw a significant rise in the amount of leisure traffic on the Waterway, and indeed in Pembrokeshire as a whole. Elsewhere in the country this has directly contributed to a significant increase in marine leisure incidents, thankfully within the Waterway this has not been the case.

Here at the Port of Milford Haven we are obligated under the Port Marine Safety Code to report incidents to the MAIB, and to investigate them ourselves so that we can ascertain if there are lessons to be learned. Lessons are of course for all parties, including commercial operators and the Port. Over the years this process has highlighted some important issues.

Once again, we will replicate the format used in the excellent MAIB Safety Digest and use the events on our own Waterway to tease out where lessons can be learned, what has gone well and what not so well. This way the wider marine community can learn from others' experiences and aim to reduce the number of incidents. All incidents discussed will be anonymised and incidents have been grouped together as "types".

As an essential element of the Port's safety management and monitoring, we record all reported Port Incident Reports (PIRs) and all reported Near Miss Reports (NMRs); these are a broad mix of commercial and leisure orientated incidents, with the occasional combination of both. In 2021 we recorded 102 NMR events and 17 PIR events. Of the 102 NMRs, 12 involved leisure vessels and of the 17 PIRs, 8 involved leisure vessels.

We will never eliminate accidents, however by paying attention to our experiences and those of others, hopefully we can reduce them over time.

Finally, once you have finished reading this, please take the time to pass the information onto someone you feel will benefit from other mariners' experiences.

Abbreviations

AIS	Automatic Identification System
ARPA	Automatic Radar Plotting Aid
BST	British Summer Time
COLREGS	Collision Regulations (International Regulations for preventing collisions at sea)
CPA	Closest Point of Approach
EPIRB	Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
EVDS	Electronic Visual Distress Signal
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LNGC	Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier
LOA	Length Over All
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MAIB	Marine Accident Investigation Branch
MCA	Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MGN	Marine Guidance Note
MHCGOC	Milford Haven Coastguard Operations Centre
NMR	Near Miss Report
NtM	Notice to Mariners
PCC	Pembrokeshire County Council
PDFT	Pembroke Dock Ferry Terminal
PIR	Port Incident Report
PLB	Personal Locating Beacon
PMSC	Port Marine Safety Code
RADAR	Radio Detection and Ranging
RHIB	Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
SART	Search and Rescue Transponder
TCPA	Time to Closest Point of Approach
VHF DSC	Very High Frequency Digital Select Calling
VLCC	Very Large Crude Carrier
VPOT	Valero Pembrokeshire Oil Terminal

Please note that a cable length or length of cable is a nautical unit of measure equal to one tenth of a nautical mile

Contents

1. Wombling free

2. Malfunction junction

3. Hook line and sinker

4. Narrow escape

5. What is our draft again?

6. Fancy a swim?



Early January and a report is received of a small motorboat aground in the Pembroke River. On investigation, it is "secured" by a thin polypropylene line tied to some rocks. Once identified, the owner was contacted and asked what the plans were to secure the vessel in a safer manner. The owner undertook to move the vessel off the water, however over the next few weeks nothing was done and the vessel continued to drift further up the Pembroke River. It was also noted that due to the condition of the vessel it was filling with water each tide.



Early May and we have the first blow of the season. 48 knots (55MPH) storm force 10, with an 8-metre maximum swell coming through the 'Heads'. A report is received from one of the tugs that there is a 40 foot yacht adrift in Pembroke Reach from a failed mooring. Angle Lifeboat is tasked, as well as a Port Vessel, as MHCOC had received a report that someone in a small boat was trying to reach the yacht. The yacht went aground before the lifeboat was able to reach her and there was no sign of a person in a small boat. The mooring owner was identified, however the yacht was not registered to the mooring. During the same storm a further vessel was reported aground at Neyland, unfortunately this vessel was badly damaged as a result of the grounding and was removed and disposed of by the owner.



Late May and one of our usual early season gales is blowing hard, 39 knots and a 5.1 metre swell coming in through the 'Heads'. A report is received of a yacht, possibly adrift, off Great Castle Head. The pilot boat attends and sounds its horn as the yacht is too close inshore for the launch to reach, no one responds to the horn so it is assumed that no one is on board. MHCOC request Angle Lifeboat launch to see if they can do anything, however the conditions are too rough. The boat is identified and the owner contacted, thankfully he was able to confirm that no one was on board and that it must have broken free from its mooring. The vessel was monitored overnight, during which time it inverted. The inverted mast then prevented the yacht from smashing onto the rocks, however the keel socket was damaged and the hull cracked near the stern. The yacht was recovered by a local company the next day, the vessel was a total loss.



Mid-August and a report is made to MHCOC and the Port of a vessel stolen off a mooring near Llangwm. The next day the Water Ranger is on patrol and finds the vessel drifting near Lawrenny, with the mooring buoy still attached to the vessel and the riser dropping into the water below. It is quickly established that the vessel has not been stolen but has suffered a failed mooring. The vessel was towed by the Water Ranger to Rudders Boatyard where the owner arranged for it to be lifted out of the water.



Late August and the Police Marine Vessel M66 reports to Port Control of a small motorboat drifting near the Traynor South Cardinal Mark. M66 took the vessel under tow and secured it to Neyland pontoon. The vessel was not registered to any mooring or marina on the Haven, however the Water Ranger knew of the vessel. As part of the investigation we were unable to identify an owner, and from the condition of the vessel it was clear that it wasn't fit to be taken on the water. The next day the vessel was taken from the pontoon without anyone sighting the owner and removed from the Waterway.

Lessons



- 1.** Maintenance, maintenance, maintenance. In virtually every mooring failure on the Milford Haven Waterway, it comes down to either a poor maintenance routine or cheap mooring tackle. There is no substitute for professional, regular maintenance and quality rated mooring tackle.
- 2.** It's not just moorings that fail, on two of these events the vessels were secured with less than sufficient ropes. A 6mm blue polypropylene line is never going to hold a boat in the long term. Spending good money on a boat then spending less than £5 to tie it up is false economy. If you want your boat to stay where you left it, head for a local chandlery and buy lines designed for the job.
- 3.** In most of these events it was easy to identify the owner and subsequently respond much quicker, however delays were caused in others due to the vessels not being registered for the mooring they were on.
- 4.** Moorings on the Milford Haven Waterway are in the main privately owned and constructed to the specifications of the registered vessel. On one of these incidents the vessel on the mooring was 12 feet longer, over 3 feet wider on the beam and 3 ton heavier than the registered vessel. Combined with storm force winds it was inevitable that something would give way.
- 5.** Many people have been cautious through the Covid 19 Pandemic. We have seen a few cases where due to lockdowns and travel restrictions, boats have been left unattended for much longer periods than usual. In the case of the "stolen" vessel, it was obvious from the condition of the upper deck and sail covers that this vessel had not been checked for a very long time as there was lichen growing on the sail covers and plastic bottles on deck that had become brittle and broken. For the 2022 season a new condition on the mooring licence is that owners are "advised to regularly maintain their vessel to ensure it remains seaworthy at all times".
- 6.** On two of these incidents, the vessel was not fit to be taken on the water and not designed for the conditions likely to be met on the Haven. A recent MAIB report (13-2021 Norma G) highlighted that vessels constructed before 1998 were not constructed to the same safety standards of modern craft, specifically not meeting the reserve buoyancy requirements, making them liable to swamping. Thankfully this had not happened to either vessel before being taken off the water.
- 7.** Two of these incidents resulted in total loss of the vessel and insurance claims. Anecdotal evidence suggests that due to a higher than other areas mooring failure rate, Milford Haven mooring holders pay a higher insurance premium.

Malfunction junction



Early April and a distress call is heard on VHF channel 16. A vessel has broken down off Milford Marina and needs assistance. MHCGOC co-ordinate and a local vessel attends to assist the broken-down vessel to their mooring.



Late evening and Angle Lifeboat is tasked by MHCGOC to a broken-down motorboat that had suffered engine failure off Dragon LNG with 3 persons on board. The vessel was towed to Milford Marina where it was placed on a berth overnight, then lifted out the next day as it was discovered to be taking on water. The vessel could be best described as near derelict and not fit to go to sea.



Mid-July and Angle Lifeboat is tasked to a broken-down motorboat off VPOT around 01:50 hrs. The vessel has a very old outboard engine that has proven unreliable and was towed to a nearby pontoon.



Mid-summer and a yacht departs Milford Marina to conduct a passage to Cornwall, initially going to anchor in Dale to await the optimum conditions before departing around 23:00 hrs. Using the engine, they made their way out through the 'Heads' only to have the bilge alarm sound. The helm checked and found what looked like coolant in the bilge, so the decision was made to return to the anchorage and await daylight to fully investigate. It was established that work to the engine was needed, so the helm requested assistance from MHCGOC to get a tow back to Milford Marina. Angle Lifeboat was tasked and the tow was conducted.

Lessons



1. Vessel breakdowns happen, it's inevitable, however there is lots you can do to prepare and minimise the chances. An annual service and regularly checking water and fuel lines will go a long way to prevent these things from happening.
2. Again we refer to the MAIB report on the Norma G, vessels and engines that are very old, not up to current safety standards and unreliable may be cheap, but you place your life at risk if you choose to take one to sea.
3. Never be afraid to say 'stop'. In the last narrative, had the helm decided to continue his journey, the consequences could have been severe, with possible failure of the engine mid passage, leaving the vessel and crew at the mercy of the prevailing conditions. The decision to return to a mooring and subsequently to Milford Marina was a good call.
4. In all the power-driven vessel breakdowns, there was no alternative means of propulsion so rendering the vessel immobile. With the yacht it was the secondary propulsion that broke down, although the yacht did have sails, it was still the right call to not continue the passage.

Hook, line and sinker




The Irish Ferry departs PDFT around 14:20 hrs bound for Rosslare. As they approach Wear Spit, they note a small yacht stationary off VPOT, in the middle of the safe navigable channel. The ferry sounded a series of 5 short and rapid blasts on the ships whistle in keeping with the COLREGS Rule 34 (d), however having no response and seeing no one on deck they slowed down to minimum steerage way. The yacht then responded on VHF channel 16 advising the Irish Ferry that he was anchored in this position because the engine had failed. The yacht was not displaying an anchor ball or any other indication that he was at anchor. To avoid collision, the Irish Ferry made a large alteration of course to the north in what can only be described as a master class in ship handling, at one point being almost beam on in the navigable channel and avoided the yacht by less than 15 metres. With this manoeuvre successfully completed, the Irish Ferry was able to continue her pilotage to sea. Port Control tasked a pilot launch to the yacht who managed to restart their engine after around 45 minutes and was escorted back to Neyland Marina.



April and the Irish Ferry is outbound for Rosslare on her afternoon run. As she is approaching Newton Noyes, she reports to Port Control that a small powerboat is anchored in the channel with the occupants fishing. On this occasion there was sufficient sea room for her to pass, however it surely felt a bit close for comfort to the occupants. A Port vessel was tasked to attend, however the vessel had already moved and was no longer in sight.

Lessons



1. Communication is key. In the first incident, had the yacht contacted Port Control on channel 12, or the Coastguard on channel 16, a vessel could have been tasked to assist before the ferry departed, or the ferry held at PDFT to mitigate any risk until the yacht was clear.
2. Bearing in mind the yacht in the first incident that had anchored due to a breakdown and the ensuing dangerous situation, why would a vessel owner choose to anchor in a navigable channel to engage in fishing? A move with potentially serious consequences.
3. An anchor is a vital piece of equipment and can be used to prevent a vessel going aground when a breakdown occurs, however anchoring in a navigable channel without raising the alarm is very dangerous. Had the ferry been unable to manoeuvre around the yacht, this incident could have been very serious indeed.
4. The Milford Haven Waterway is a defined narrow channel and as such Rule 9 of the COLREGS apply, specifically:
"Any vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid anchoring in a narrow channel".
Annual Standing Notice to Mariners 25 also applies.

Narrow escape



Late May and the Waterway is busy with leisure traffic. The Irish Ferry is departing PDFT for her afternoon run to Rosslare. As she is approaching Carr Spit, the Ferry's ARPA system identifies a target as a potential collision risk. The Master sounds 5 short blasts on the ship's whistle to try and ascertain the vessel's intentions. The vessel makes an obvious turn to starboard to clear out the channel. The CPA is measured at 0.5 of a cable (approx. 92.5 metres). As part of the investigation, the RADAR recording from Port Control is viewed. It shows a small target rounding Wear Spit close to the port side of the channel. It then continues in a diagonal line across the channel towards Carr Spit on the starboard side of the channel, then remains on the starboard side until Dockyard Bank 4 navigation mark, then takes a direct line to the port side of the channel, rounding Neyland Spit close on the port side before entering Neyland for fuel.




Almost midnight, and an oil tanker is inbound with a pilot on board. Approaching the Qatar buoy, a yacht heading generally west makes a turn to port and passes ahead of the vessel from north to south, causing the vessel to take avoiding action to increase the CPA by making a turn to port. CPA measured at 1 cable (185 metres) which by calculating the closing speed equated to 36 seconds from collision. The start of the manoeuvre was approx. 0.5 cables ahead, approx. 92.5 metres, and the yacht increased its speed to try and make the crossing quicker.



Mid-summer and an LPG tanker is inbound around the Chapel Buoy. A yacht starts the crossing from north to south ahead of the vessel. The ARPA system identifies the yacht as a collision risk and so the Master sounds 5 short blasts on the ship's whistle to clarify the sailing vessel's intentions. The yacht crossed approximately 2.5 cables ahead of the tanker, which equates to 1 minute from collision based on the tanker's speed.

Lessons



1. Rule 9 - Narrow Channels: (a) "A vessel proceeding along the course of a narrow channel or fairway shall keep as near to the outer limit of the channel or fairway which lies on her starboard side as is safe and practicable". On at least two occasions, this vessel was on the port side of the channel, essentially taking as straight a line as they could rather than following the channel.
2. When crossing a channel, it is best practice to cross on a heading as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general direction of traffic flow. This means that you cross the channel as quick as possible rather than a meandering diagonal line.
3. Because the vessel crossed the channel diagonally, he created the situation where he was impeding the safe transit of a vessel that can only navigate within the narrow channel. Again, Rule 9 (d) "A vessel shall not cross a narrow channel or fairway if such crossing impedes the passage of a vessel which can safely navigate only within such channel or fairway". The latter vessel may use the sound signal prescribed in Rule 34 (d) if in doubt as to the intention of the crossing vessel.

Lessons (cont)

4. All vessels before they depart a berth should have a passage plan which should reference Harbour Byelaws, COLREGS and conduct of the vessel. For commercial vessels this is mandatory, for leisure vessels it is good practice. In two of these cases, the vessels cross at near right angles to the channel, however what comes into question is did they need to? Could the move have been made much earlier within their passage so avoiding the situation in the first place? On both counts, the vessels were in the pinch point between the terminals and the Angle coastline. This area is noted on the leisure guide as a 'caution area', specifically "These areas have a high incidence of close quarter situations between craft of less than 20 metres in length, and vessels that can only navigate within the fairway. Recreational craft should navigate with extreme caution in these areas". By careful passage planning the vessels could either have held back near Cunjic and waited for the vessels to pass, or crossed the channel to the south immediately west of Valero and taken the vessel out of the channel and clear of the tankers.

5. In all of these incidents, had the vessels been maintaining a listening watch on VHF channel 12, they would have received notification of these large commercial vessels, been aware of where they were going and due to the nature of the designated reporting points for reporting vessels, also been aware of the vessels' approximate locations. When inbound, reporting vessels call Port Control on entering the east or west channel, and when passing Thorne Rock Light Buoy, Cunjic Light Buoy and Wear Spit mark. Outbound vessels at Wear Spit, Cunjic Light Buoy, Qatar Light Buoy and on leaving the east or west channel.

What is our draft again?




Late summer and a yacht is eastbound approaching Wear Spit, and the Irish Ferry is westbound rounding Carr Rocks. To avoid any possible conflict, the yacht helm decided to cut outside of the channel and transit Wear Spit. Low tide had been 40 minutes prior to this manoeuvre. On grounding, the helm checked the charts and noted the warning regarding oil pipelines and that if fractured could cause explosion or other hazard. Concerned reading this, the helm made contact with his marina who advised he contact Port Control. Port Control contacted MHC GOC who tasked the Angle Lifeboat and the Water Ranger to attend. As these vessels arrived, the yacht was re-floating but was escorted back to Neyland Marina as a precautionary measure. The helm arranged for the yacht to be lifted and checked for damage, none was found.



Winter yacht racing and a report is received of a yacht aground on Carr Rocks. The yacht was in contact with MHC GOC, no injuries and no sign of water ingress. The helm was happy to wait for the tide to re-float which was successfully achieved some 3 hours later. The yacht was thoroughly checked by the owner and no damage had occurred.

Lessons



1. Groundings remain a relatively regular occurrence on the Waterway, sometimes due to a lack of situational awareness, sometimes due to a lack of local knowledge, and sometimes as a reaction to a developing situation. Whatever the reason, effective passage planning, a VHF listening watch on channel 12 and using all available means to maintain a traffic picture will assist you in avoiding these situations.

Lessons (cont)

2. In each of these cases, what the helm did afterwards was correct. They raised the alarm, they checked their vessels and crew, then followed those checks up once back at their berth. This is in keeping with the recommendations from the MAIB following the Cheeky Rafiki incident, which is regularly referenced in these documents as well as other publications. The MCA have also issued MGN 613 (M) Yacht and powerboat safety at sea – grounding of fixed fin keel GRP yachts - good practice, which is well worth a read.

3. Yacht racing is a popular pastime on the Waterway, however we have observed that maybe the race officer could plan the courses with regard to the tidal conditions and anticipate the likely courses taken by the more competitive members. In recent years we have seen groundings on Carr Rocks occur on more than six occasions, and always because of a risk vs advantage call made by the racing yacht, sometimes because they have misread the tide tables, but more often taking a chance for competitive advantage. On this occasion the tide was at 1.6m, ebbing, 1 hour 25 minutes before low water. What price do you put on the safety of your vessel and crew?

Fancy a swim?



Late August and the Water Ranger was dealing with a matter at Hobbs Point when they observed a small Rhib run suddenly out of control and eject one of the persons overboard near Neyland Spit. They immediately attended and found a female passenger in the process of being recovered by the helm. She was cold and shocked by the sudden turn of events but unharmed. The patrol assisted her onboard and helped get her lifejacket off so that warm clothing could be donned. It was immediately apparent that the steering wheel was disconnected somehow, but the helm was able to steer directly at the engine, so once all was sorted the patrol shadowed the vessel back to their launch site. Both persons on board had been wearing auto-inflating lifejackets. The casualty's jacket had deployed on impact with the water and had no doubt assisted her as well as helping prevent injuries. The helm had also been wearing the kill cord. It was obvious that the vessel was maintained, all gear was appropriately stored and the joints etc all had evidence of recent greasing/maintenance. While investigating the cause with the helm, it was discovered that the steering cable had snapped inside the outer sheathing. It was located in such a way as to prevent full inspection and had snapped deep inside the console. The Water Ranger patrol talked through the equipment that the vessel had on board, this included flares, a handheld VHF radio and mobile phone in a dry bag, as well as spare dry clothing.




Mid-September and a "Man Overboard" is heard several times on VHF Channel 12. On questioning from Port Control as to the location, there was no response. Several vessels offered assistance, the Irish Ferry had observed the immediate aftermath from a vessel near the Qatar Buoy so called this in. The Water Ranger made best speed from his location in Dale, and on arrival a local survey vessel was recovering a casualty from the water. MHCGOC tasked Angle Lifeboat who were also quickly on the scene. The Water Ranger ensured that the casualty was safely on board the survey vessel. The casualty had a head injury, so the vessel was advised to head for the Port Authority jetty, shadowed by the lifeboat. An ambulance was requested, and the vessel was subsequently directed to the Mackerel Stage as an air ambulance was tasked instead. Meanwhile, the casualty's yacht was left single handed, so the Water Ranger patrol put a crew member on board to assist getting the yacht to Milford Marina. On arrival at the Mackerel Stage, the casualty was assessed by the air ambulance medic and transported by ambulance to hospital. The Water Ranger patrol then assisted, along with another berth holder, to get the yacht onto their marina berth. In conducting the investigation the occupants reported that "while returning to Milford Marina, the yacht was rolling side to side so I put my safety harness on then started putting fenders out in preparation for our return. I had laid the starboard ones and was heading back to the cockpit when the yacht fouled hard,

jibed, then the next thing I knew was waking up hanging over the side of the yacht secured by the safety line”.


The casualty’s legs were caught by the knees on the top rail, feet against the wheelhouse and head in the water. The crew cleared the feet from the wheelhouse which let the casualty fall into the water, however they were being dragged under as the yacht was still making way. Left with no choice, the crew released the casualty from the boat, so enabling a head up position floating clear of the yacht.

Lessons (from the helm and crew of case number 2)



1. When going forward to put fenders out, lower the mainsail.
2. Practice use of the rope boarding ladder.
3. Practice MOB drills.
4. If being held under by safety line, pass the life ring with line attached to them before releasing the harness, at least this way they stay with the vessel.
5. Check the VHF channel or even better use the “red panic button”.

Lessons



1. In the first incident, the vessel was well maintained and the break could not have been identified. However, consider how old your steering cable is and consider replacing it. Corrosion can still affect it, despite it being inside sheathing and under the console.
2. In the second case, the crew had to leave the helm station to get to the VHF. Many yachts have the VHF in the lower cabin, some then carry a handheld when on deck, but a fixed station on deck would be a better option.
3. There is no substitute for practicing MOB drills, not just ‘this is how I’ll do it’ but properly using what you intend to use, it’s very different to theory.
4. On both occasions, auto inflating 150 Newton lifejackets were worn and worked, this helped lessen injury and undoubtedly saved lives – please make sure that you wear a lifejacket.
5. Do a VHF course, they are cheap and available with several providers locally.
6. Consider your task and when you do it. In the second incident, the yacht was still a long way from the marina. Weather conditions and where they were meant that they were experiencing the full effect of the wind. Had they waited till the shelter of the Valero Jetty/southern shore, then conditions were much calmer and so safer to access the open deck.
7. There are many pros and cons to wearing safety lanyards, and they undoubtedly save lives. However, if your vessel is still making way, you may be dragged under the water. Practice stopping the boat and always carry a knife on your person so that you can cut yourself loose if needed.
8. Consider buying a PLB for everyone on board. They deploy automatically and allow the emergency services to find you if you are unable to communicate. It may not be the cheapest safety item, but you can’t put a price on your life.
9. If you do find yourself in the water, follow the RNLI advice and **Float to Live**.

Useful Links

<http://www.collisionregs.com/MSNI781.pdf>

<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/marine-guidance-notices-mgns>

<https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/weather/forecast>

<https://www.mhpa.co.uk/enjoy-the-waterway/>

<https://mli.org/safety/how-to-call-for-help-at-sea>

<https://mli.org/safety/know-the-risks/cold-water-shock>


<https://mli.org/safety/lifejackets>

<https://mli.org/safety/respect-the-water>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PhosUOCSrQA>

Stay safe...

WEAR A SUITABLE LIFEJACKET OR BUOYANCY AID
SERVICE EQUIPMENT
GET TRAINED
MAKE A PLAN
KNOW YOUR LIMITS
CARRY DISTRESS SIGNALS
USE THE KILL CORD
KNOW YOUR BOAT
HAVE A RADIO
CHECK THE WEATHER



on the Milford Haven Waterway!

The Milford Haven Waterway is regulated by the Port of Milford Haven and it's important to us that all users continue to enjoy the many recreational opportunities offered by this fabulous Waterway, in a way that is safe.

We recommend that you:

- ✓ **Understand the local byelaws** and other directions such as collision regulations www.mhpa.co.uk/marine-services
- ✓ **Listen in to VHF Channel 12** for shipping and port information and navigation warnings
- ✓ **Be aware of local codes of conduct** that exist to minimise disturbance to wildlife www.pembrokeshiremarinocode.org.uk
- ✓ **Respect wildlife and natural habitats** www.pembrokeshiremarinesac.org.uk
- ✓ **Wear a Lifejacket** whenever you are on the water completeguide.rnli.org/lifejackets
- ✓ **Get to know the zoned areas for specific low and high speed activities** by picking up a leisure user guide or downloading one from www.mhpa.co.uk/safety-on-the-water
- ✓ **Subscribe to receive Notices to Mariners** www.mhpa.co.uk/subscribe



Port of Milford Haven

Port of Milford Haven
Gorsewood Drive
Milford Haven
Pembrokeshire
SA73 3EP
T: +44 (0)1646 696100
E: enquiries@mhpa.co.uk
www.mhpa.co.uk



Port of Milford Haven